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A Revolution in Muslim Family Law? 
Egypt’s Pre- and Post-Revolutionary 
Period (2011-2013) Compared 
 
NADIA SONNEVELD and MONIKA LINDBEKK* 
 
Abstract In the weeks following the Egyptian revolution of 2011, a group of divorced fathers 
rose to demand a “revolution in family law.” Portraying extant family law provisions as 
symbolic of the old regime and as deviating from the principles of shariʿa, their call was given 
prominent media attention and, in the ensuing transitional period (2011 to 2013), women’s 
rights and family law emerged as contentious areas in Egypt. 
By comparing public debates on family law reform in the decade preceding the 2011 
revolution to the two years following it, we argue that Egypt’s “revolution in family law” 
actually started a decade earlier, in 2000, when Egyptian women’s new right to divorce 
unilaterally rocked the country.
1
 This set in motion other legal reforms that challenged 
fundamental aspects of male authority in the family and slowly led to the emergence of 
innovative conceptions of motherhood and fatherhood. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
We won’t give up and we won’t go back again,  
Long live Maṣr, 
And we won’t abandon any claim,  
Long live Maṣr, 
Our human right is all we want,  
Long live Maṣr, 
Social justice (ʿadāla ʾijtimāʿiyya) and bread to eat,  
Long live Maṣr, 
We will no longer be quiet and we will not hide what we think, 
Enough injustice and poverty, and enough that happened to us,  
Long live Maṣr and long live freedom, 
Revolution until victory,  
In ʾumm al-dunyā…. 
 
In the above song, penned during the 2011 revolution, two terms are employed to designate 
Egypt: Maṣr–the usual way for Egyptians to refer to Egypt–and ʾumm al-dunyā–the mother of 
the world. While ʾumm al-dunyā is used by Egyptians to refer to both Egypt and Cairo in a 
loving manner, the term simultaneously reveals a symbolic connection between motherhood and 
                                                     
* Nadia Sonneveld is a researcher at the Radboud University Nijmegen, the Netherlands, and scholar-in-residence at 
Al-Akhawayn University Ifrane, Morocco for the academic year 2014-2015. Monika Lindbekk is a Doctoral 
Research Fellow at the University of Oslo. 
1
 In this article, we use the terms family law and personal status law interchangeably. 
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the nation, suggesting that women’s identity is intrinsically linked with reproduction, nursing and 
upholding the family as the cornerstone of society.
2
 
In post-revolutionary Egypt–the period between the resignation of former President 
Mubarak in February 2011 and the forced removal of his successor Muhammad Morsi in July 
2013–Muslim family law was a contentious issue. This testified to the centrality of “the [nuclear] 
family” and the rights and duties of husbands, wives, and children within the social structure of 
Egypt. The importance of the family in shaping a new Egypt was also a major focus of the first 
part of Egypt’s 2012 Constitution (replaced in January 2014), which dealt with the “Fundamental 
Principles” of the new state. One principle stipulated that “the family is the basis of society, 
founded on religion, morality, and patriotism, and the state and society are intent on ensuring the 
authentic character of the Egyptian family, its coherence and stability, and the protection of its 
traditions and moral values; as regulated by law.”3 
Hence, in the post-revolutionary context men’s and women’s rights were debated not 
only with respect to the waṭan (homeland) but also with respect to the smaller circle of the 
family and the household.
4
 For example, in the months following the revolution, groups of 
divorced fathers, among others, stood up and started challenging the existing family law 
provisions, most particularly those pertaining to women’s unilateral divorce rights, child custody 
and visitation rights, and educational guardianship of children. They argued that these provisions 
were against the shariʿa, would cause the breakdown of Egyptian family life, and were a 
Western invention introduced to the country by the wife of the ex-president, Suzanne Mubarak. 
They concluded that the family laws were “Suzanne Mubarak laws” and in need of a 
“revolution” in order to purge Egypt of any remnants of the authoritarian regime.5 Their call 
could have remained an isolated incident attracting little media attention. After all, why would 
the Egyptian people be interested in changing the laws that regulate family life matters, possibly 
the only haven of stability in an otherwise chaotic transitional period? The opposite became true, 
however, as the divorced fathers gained the support of many different groups–from Muslim 
Brotherhood members to Salafists, judges, and even liberals. 
In this article we take a longitudinal approach. By comparing public debates surrounding 
Muslim family law in the period preceding the 2011 revolution to those taking place between 
February 2011 and July 2013, we want to make clear that the protests by fathers’ rights groups 
should be understood in the context of almost a century of Egyptian family law reform that 
culminated in a series of controversial reforms introduced in the 2000s. These reforms changed 
both the husband-wife and parent-child relationship considerably. 
The article consists of three sections. In section one, we provide a short history of family 
law reform in Egypt with a special focus on men’s and women’s divorce rights as well as legal 
rules concerning child custody and guardianship. We will focus on the period from 1919–when 
the stage was set for the first family law reforms–until the first decade of the twenty-first century 
when a series of reforms was implemented. Analyzing these reforms and the controversy they 
                                                     
2
 Beth Baron, Egypt as a Woman: Nationalism, Gender, and Politics (Cairo: The American University in Cairo 
Press, 2005), 7. 
3
 Article 10 of December 2012 Constitution. Translation by the authors. This article was retained in the 2014 
constitution. 
4
 It is important to note that this prevalence of the family over the individual is not new; Egypt’s 1971 Constitution, 
which was immediately abolished after the revolution, also stipulates state support for the family (Article 9) and the 
protection of motherhood and childhood (Article 10). 
5
 Cf. Egyptian newspapers Al-ʾAhrām, 29 April 2011, Al-Dustūr, 29 April 2011, Ahram Online, 23 May 2011, Al-
Shurūq, 9 May 2011. 
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caused will make clear that women’s organizations and the alliances they established with high-
ranking politicians and religious experts were often instrumental in bringing about family law 
reforms that diverged from existing notions of what it meant to be a man or a woman in the 
Egyptian context.
6
 
Focusing on the period between the ouster of Mubarak in February 2011 and that of his 
successor Morsi in July 2013, we will continue in section two by describing how fathers’ rights 
groups entered the public debate. Although small, these groups became quite vocal. We will also 
pay attention to the pleas of small groups of divorced mothers who fought against the divorced 
fathers and for the preservation of the extant family law provisions.  
In section three, we will describe how the fathers’ and mothers’ rights groups were able 
to establish alliances with the political actors and institutions that rose to political prominence 
after the ouster of Mubarak in order to see their aims realized. We argue that the controversies 
about family law during the post-revolutionary period must be analyzed in a context where the 
partial disintegration and transformation of the old system paved the way for both old (al-Azhar, 
the Ministry of Justice, the High Constitutional Court) and new actors and institutions to assume 
the power to interpret Islamic shari‘a. The most outstanding feature of the new post-
revolutionary Egyptian public sphere was not only the inclusion of new actors but also the extent 
to which some of them, such as the divorced fathers’ and divorced mothers’ groups, had a direct 
and personal interest in changing or retaining the status quo. In order to achieve their goal, these 
groups established alliances with both established and new actors. Given the myriad of political 
formations established in this process, we warn against studying the transformation of the public 
sphere and the impact it has on extant family law through the use of oppositional categories. 
Both before and after the 2011 revolution, for example, it is hard to discern between the Islamist 
and the feminist.
7
 Should we label as Islamists the divorced fathers who seek political support 
from the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafists or should we label them as feminists for 
expressing a desire to divide childcare duties between mothers and fathers more evenly? And do 
the divorced mothers of Egypt, who claim that childcare is the exclusive duty of mothers and 
financial maintenance is the duty of fathers, represent a feminist voice? Can it be said that they 
fight for “women’s rights” and the divorced fathers for “men’s rights”? Because it is generally 
not easy to establish what “men’s” and “women’s rights” are, let alone establish in this particular 
context which groups defend “women’s” or “men’s rights”, we have decided to simply speak in 
terms of the divorced fathers’ and the divorced mothers’ groups.  
 
 
A Short History of Family Law Reform in Egypt: 1919-2008 
 
The year 1919 was remarkable in Egyptian history for two reasons: it marked the beginning of 
the Egyptian people’s revolt against British domination and the participation of women in the 
large-scale demonstrations against the British. Marching separately from the men, it was the first 
                                                     
6
 See Diane Singerman, “Rewriting Divorce in Egypt: Reclaiming Islam, Legal Activism, and Coalition Politics,” in 
Remaking Muslim Politics: Pluralism, Contestation, Democratization, ed. Robert W. Hefner (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 2005), 161–88; Mona Zulfiqar, “The Islamic Marriage Contract in Egypt,” in The 
Islamic Marriage Contract: Case Studies in Islamic Family Law, ed. A. Quraishi and F.E. Vogel (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2008), 231-74. 
7
 For the pre-revolutionary situation, see Nadia Sonneveld, Khul’ Divorce in Egypt: Public Debates, Judicial 
Practices, and Everyday Life (Cairo and New York: American University in Cairo Press and Oxford University 
Press, 2012), chapter 2. 
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time in Egyptian history that women took to the streets and made their presence so publicly 
visible.
8
 In fact, in 1919 the liberation of the nation from British occupation was closely related 
to taḥrīr al-marʾa – the liberation of women, which is vividly illustrated by the fact that the 
women demonstrators, mostly members from the middle and upper classes, fought not only for 
national freedom but also for personal freedom within the realm of the family. Subjugated to 
arranged marriages to husbands who could marry polygamously and divorce at will, these 
women had a direct and personal interest in changing existing traditions regulating family life, 
most notably those concerning polygamy, women’s access to divorce, a minimum age for 
marriage, and choice of spouse.
9
 Adopting the ideals of companionate marriage, both national 
reformers and the women demonstrators (some of whom later united in the Egyptian Feminist 
Union in 1923) believed that giving women more rights would strengthen the marital bond–the 
foundation stone of the emerging nation–and by extension prevent Egyptian society from falling 
under foreign domination again. Although this led to a series of reforms in the 1920s, women’s 
rights activists felt the reforms reflected few of their demands and they soon directed their 
attention to issues beyond family law reform.
10
 
In terms of marital rights and responsibilities, the reforms stressed a husband’s duty to 
provide maintenance (nafaqa) to his wife and the wife’s duty to pay obedience to her husband in 
return (Article 1 of Personal Status Law (hereafter PSL) no. 25 of 1920). When a husband was 
providing nafaqa, a wife had the legal obligation to ask her husband for permission to leave the 
house. But if the husband was not providing, due to illness or imprisonment, for example, a 
woman could ask the judge for a divorce and subsequently marry again.
11
 In turn, new 
procedural restrictions made it more difficult for a man to divorce his wife/wives. The triple 
repudiation, for example, was no longer valid as a final divorce (Article 3 in PSL no. 25 of 
1929). In terms of parental authority, the husband, as head of the household, was accorded the 
right and duty to guardianship of his children. This meant that he should supervise the children in 
financial affairs and matters such as the choice of school (wilāyat al-māl and wilāya taʿlīmiyya). 
In these reforms, custody (wilāyat al- ḥaḍāna), meaning the day-to-day care of children, 
remained the right and duty of mothers (Article 20 of PSL no. 25 of 1929, explained in more 
detail below). 
In this era, legal reformers believed that men who uttered the repudiation at whim were 
responsible for the high divorce rate. They hoped that the new legal measures would safeguard 
the foundation of the Egyptian family.
12
 Statistics indeed show that at the beginning of the 1930s 
                                                     
8
 Beth Baron, Egypt as a Woman, 113. 
9
 Margot Badran, Feminists, Islam, and Nation: Gender and the Making of Modern Egypt (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1996), chapter 1. 
10
 Badran, Feminists, Islam, and Nation, 125-6. 
11
 These grounds are as follows: prolonged absence of the husband without legitimate cause for a period exceeding 
one year (Article 12 of Personal Status Law no. 25 of 1929); imprisonment of the husband for a period exceeding 
three years (Article 14 of Personal Status Law no. 25 of 1929); mental or grave and incurable sickness of the 
husband of which the wife had no knowledge at the time of contracting the marriage (Article 9 of Law no. 25 of 
1929); a husband’s failure to provide maintenance or a husband’s harming of the wife (Article 6 of Personal Status 
Law no. 25 of 1929; amended by Personal Status Law no. 100 of 1985) (cf. Nathalie Bernard-Maugiron, “Quelques 
Développements Récents dans le Droit du Statut Personnel en Égypte,” Revue Internationale de Droit Comparé, II 
(2004), 355–85, esp. 360. 
12
 See Hanan Kholoussy, “The Nationalization of Marriage in Monarchical Egypt,” in Re-envisioning Egypt 1919-
1952, ed. Arthur Goldschmidt, Amy J. Johnson and Barak A. Salmoni (Cairo, the American University in Cairo 
Press, 2005), 317-50. 
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50 percent of all registered marriages in Cairo ended in divorce.
13
 Interestingly, while women as 
upholders of the family were seen as the cornerstone of the new nation, their relationship to the 
nation was not articulated in the 1923 Constitution. Although they had actively participated in 
the revolutionary activities, Egypt’s first constitution was silent on the role of women as 
members of the new nation and its political system.
14
 It would take another thirty-three years 
before women’s membership of the nation was finally proclaimed under Nasser (r. 1952-1970) in 
Article 61 of the 1956 Constitution. In general, the Nasser regime encouraged women to 
participate in public life through voting and wage work but no substantive amendments to the 
family laws were introduced.
15
 As a result, women remained the dependents of men in the realm 
of the family despite an official commitment to gender equality.
16
 
 
Personal Status Law under Sadat and Mubarak 
 
It was not until under Sadat (r. 1970-1981) that substantive family law was reformed again. The 
reforms issued under Sadat’s leadership, as codified in PSL no. 44 of 1979, were very 
controversial, both in their content and in how they were promulgated. Their introduction 
coincided with the first and second UN Conferences on Women, held in Mexico (1975) and 
Copenhagen (1980) respectively. With Sadat’s wife, Jihan, heading the Egyptian delegation in 
Copenhagen, it was thought by many that Jihan was behind the reforms and, consequently, the 
reforms became widely known as “Jihan’s laws.” Jihan’s laws changed the personal status laws 
of 1920 and 1929 considerably, as the definition of the conjugal relationship was altered in 
various ways. For example, a woman’s right to maintenance (nafaqa) from her husband was not 
affected if she went out to work without the consent of the husband (Article 2). One of the most 
controversial issues concerned a woman’s right to petition for judicial divorce from a husband 
who married a second wife without her consent, a divorce which she would be granted 
automatically under the new law (Article 6). Also controversial was the right of women custody-
holders to keep the marital home in case of a divorce (Article 4). 
While Sadat tried to expand women’s rights by introducing changes in the field of family 
law as well as by signing a number of international UN treaties on women, most notably the 
CEDAW (Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women) in 
1981, he simultaneously had to respond to a global wave of Islamic revival which led various 
groups in Egyptian society to demand a complete implementation of Islamic shariʿa. Sadat 
reacted by including a provision in the constitution decreeing that the principles of Islamic 
shariʿa were a (1971) and the (1980) main source of legislation. He also altered women’s 
citizenship rights considerably. Whereas Article 19 of the 1956 (Nasser) Constitution had stated 
that “The state makes it possible for women the accommodation between her work in society and 
her duties towards the family” [translation by authors], Article 11 of the 1971 (Sadat) 
                                                     
13
 Philippe Fargues, “Terminating Marriage,” in The New Arab Family, ed. Nicholas S. Hopkins (Cairo: American 
University in Cairo Press, 2003), 247–73, esp. 258. 
14
 Mervat Hatem, “The Pitfalls of the Nationalist Discourses on Citizenship in Egypt,” in Gender and Citizenship in 
the Middle East, ed. Suad Joseph (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2000), 33–57, esp. 38. 
15
 In 1955, the Nasser government abolished the shariʿa courts and transferred the jurisdiction over personal status 
law (hereafter, PSL) affairs to the civil courts (Law no. 462 of 1955). 
16
 Laura Bier, ‘"The Family is a Factory": Gender, Citizenship, and the Regulation of Reproduction in Postwar 
Egypt,” Feminist Studies 36, 2 (2010), 404-432. See also, Yüksel Sezgin, Human Rights under State-Enforced 
Religious Family Laws in Israel, Egypt and India (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Sonneveld, 
Khul‘ Divorce in Egypt; Malika Zeghal, “Religion and Politics in Egypt: The Ulema of al-Azhar, Radical Islam, and 
the State (1952–94),” International Journal of Middle East Studies 31, 1 (1999), 371–99. 
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Constitution read “The state supports the accommodation between women’s duties towards the 
family and her work in society, and her equality with men in the political, social, cultural and 
economic arenas, without violating the principles of Islamic shariʿa” [translation and emphasis 
by authors]. By taking the shariʿa as a reference point for women’s role in society, gender 
equality only applied when it did not contradict the shariʿa.17 This was confusing because the 
shariʿa, as reflected in Egypt’s personal status laws, claimed that a woman should be obedient to 
a husband who is providing nafaqa (maintenance) for her.
18
 In practice, this meant that women 
had the right to study, were able to work outside the home legally, and could even occupy posts 
as ministers. Yet in order to leave the house, they still needed their husband’s permission.  
In 1985, the High Constitutional Court (HCC) struck down Sadat’s PSL no. 44 from 1979 
on procedural grounds. The 1980s were marked by an increase in women’s rights activism, and 
ahead of the 1985 UN conference on women in Nairobi, Sadat’s successor, Hosni Mubarak, was 
under considerable pressure to prevent a return to the legal situation prior to the 1979 law.
19
 This 
resulted in the passage of the 1985 Personal Status Law (which was a watered-down version of 
the repealed 1979 PSL) and in the period after its passage
20
 a group of women activists sought 
the cooperation of the Ministry of Justice, and particularly of a high-ranking official named Fathi 
Najib, in order to address the subordinate position of women in personal status law. In order to 
make the reforms conform to Islamic shariʿa, they also sought the approval of high-ranking 
religious scholars within al-Azhar. The activists, who called themselves “The Group of Seven,” 
first set out to reintroduce the old Islamic marriage contract, which had included the right to 
enter substantive stipulations. According to Mona Zulfiqar, lawyer and prominent member of 
The Group of Seven, when the campaign for the new marriage contract realized that it lacked 
popular support (ca. 1995), they decided to change their focus to the passage of a new procedural 
personal status law.
21
 Five years later, on 26 January 2000, the Egyptian People’s Assembly 
passed a new procedural law on personal status called the Reorganization of Certain Terms and 
Procedures of Litigation in Personal Status Matters. Three days later, former President Hosni 
Mubarak promulgated the law in the Official Gazette as Law no. 1 of 2000.
22
 The new law aimed 
to facilitate and speed up litigation in matters pertaining to personal status disputes such as 
divorce by compressing the 318 clauses of the old procedural law into seventy-nine. 
Interestingly, the new procedural law also contained a few substantive clauses, such as the 
legalization of divorces from ʿurfī marriages (Article 17).23 Both clauses provoked much 
                                                     
17
 Selma Botman, Engendering Citizenship in Egypt (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 79, and Hatem, 
“The Pitfalls of the Nationalist Discourses on Citizenship in Egypt,” 53-4. 
18
 Articles 1 and 11 bis. 2 of PSL no. 100 of 1985. 
19
 Iman Bibars, Women’s Political Interest Groups in Egypt. A thesis presented to the economics- 
political science department at the American University in Cairo, 1987, 150; Fawzi Najjar, 
 “Egypt’s Laws of Personal Status”. Arab studies quarterly, 10. 3 (1988), 319-344, esp. 342. 
20
 The main difference between the 1979 and the 1985 PSLs was the absence of the clause that restricted a man’s 
right to polygyny. The 1985 PSL still offered a woman the ability to divorce her husband if he took a second wife, 
but she needed to prove to the judge that polygyny had caused her harm. In contrast, the 1979 PSL simply declared 
polygyny injurious to the wife. Under the old PSL of 1929, the judge decided whether polygyny was harmful to the 
wife or not. 
21
 Zulfiqar, “The Islamic Marriage Contract in Egypt,” 240. 
22
 Cf. Nathalie Bernard-Maugiron, “Quelques Développements Récents dans le Droit du Statut Personnel en 
Égypte.” 
23
 ʿUrfi marriages are marriages that are not registered with the relevant state authorities. For a fuller discussion see 
Nadia Sonneveld, “Rethinking the Difference Between Formal and Informal Marriages in Egypt,” in Family Law in 
Islam: Divorce, Marriage and Women in the Muslim World, ed. Maaike Voorhoeve (London and New York: I.B. 
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controversy, but the clause that met with the most resistance included a new interpretation of 
khulʿ (divorce procedure through which a wife pays the husband a sum of money in exchange for 
release from the marriage contract, Article 20). The fact that the law became popularly known as 
the “khulʿ law” testifies to this. 
 
 
The Khulʿ of 2000: Setting in Motion a Revolution in Family Law 
 
If anything, the public debate on khulʿ witnessed a great number of participants who all used 
religious arguments to justify their position on the new divorce provision. The Group of Seven, 
leading figures within al-Azhar, and high-ranking figures within the Ministry of Justice did their 
best to convince the public that khulʿ was based on Islamic tradition and in line with the Qur’ān 
and the sunna of the Prophet. In particular, they referred to a ḥadīth in which the Prophet grants a 
woman a divorce without inquiring about the consent of her husband.
24
 However, opponents 
ranging from the liberal al-Wafd newspaper to the Islamists’ mouthpiece al-Shaʿb fiercely 
opposed the article on the grounds that the four schools of Sunni jurisprudence all define khulʿ as 
a consensual divorce which requires the explicit approval of the husband. Some opponents also 
stated that khulʿ was a Western invention and part of a Zionist conspiracy, introduced to Egypt 
by Westernized women’s rights groups.25 
Opponents also castigated the late sheikh of al-Azhar, Tantawi (1928-2010). In fact, 
Sheikh Tantawi’s reputation as a figurehead representing the views of the government was a 
recurring topic in the debates on khulʿ, especially after Tantawi did not hesitate to claim 
repeatedly in front of the People’s Assembly that the majority of the members of the Academy 
for Islamic Research had expressed their approval of the new law as well of its conformity with 
Islam.
26
 This prompted some members of the Academy to give anonymous interviews in the 
Islamist newspaper al-Sha‘b asserting that this was not true. Tantawi, they said, was behaving 
like a muwaẓẓaf (civil servant) and not as the sheikh of al-Azhar.27 
In general, both liberal and conservative opponents claimed that khulʿ deviated from the 
principles of shariʿa and would therefore destabilize the Egyptian family, and, by extension, 
Egyptian society. While in the early twentieth century “rash and irrational” husbands were held 
responsible for the high divorce rate, almost a century later women started to bear the brunt of 
the blame. In cartoons in liberal newspapers, for example, women were portrayed as having low 
sexual morals and as willing to ask for a divorce for frivolous reasons. The tolerance of such 
behavior, opponents argued, would lead to an increase in the divorce rate and cause children to 
grow up as vagabonds.
28
 Advocates of the divorce reform were quick to point out that khulʿ 
                                                                                                                                                                           
Tauris, 2012), 77-102. See also Monika Lindbekk, “Enforcement of Personal Status Law by Egyptian Courts,” in 
Adjudicating Family Law in Muslim Courts, ed. Elisa Guinchi (London: Routledge, 2013), 87-106.  
24
 This is a reference to the so-called Habiba ḥadīth. The most common wording of this ḥadīth is presented by al-
Bukhari, who reported: “The wife of Thabit b. Qays b. Shammas [Ḥabiba] came to the Messenger, peace be upon 
him, and said: ‘O Messenger of God, I do not hate Thabit neither because of his faith nor his nature, except that I 
fear unbelief.’ The Messenger of God, peace be upon him, said: ‘Will you give back his orchard?’ She said ‘Yes’ 
and she gave it back to him and he [the Prophet] ordered him and so he [Thabit] separated her” (Abū ‘Abd Allah al-
Bukhārī, Kitāb al-jāmi‘ al-sahīh. Vol. 3. edited by Ludolf M. Krehl (Leiden: Brill, 1868), 266. 
25
 Sonneveld, Khul‘ Divorce in Egypt. 
26
 Cf. Al-ʾAhālī, 19 January 2000, 10; Al-Shaʿb, 18 January 2000, 3. 
27
Al-Shaʿb, 21 January 2000, 2.  
28
 For more, see Sonneveld, Khul’ Divorce in Egypt, chapter 2. 
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would put more balance into the marital relationship and that it would not affect the alimony 
rights of children.
29
 Notwithstanding the public upheaval, in 2002 the HCC decided that the 
article on khulʿ was constitutional by referring to the Habiba ḥadīth mentioned above, among 
other things. Although it is difficult to establish to what extent the general public saw (and still 
sees) the magistrates of the HCC as authorities in matters pertaining to shariʿa and family law,30 
it is significant that while the introduction of khulʿ in 2000 made headlines, the court’s eventual 
ruling in 2002 on khulʿ was hardly contested in the press.31 
 
Children 
 
In the early twentieth century, nationalist discourse had extolled the mother as the primary 
parental authority; the nationalist duty of the father was merely to “control the wife as educator 
within the family.”32 In the field of family law, however, matters were different and bore a close 
resemblance to Hanafi jurisprudence: according to Article 20 in PSL no. 25 of 1929, a mother 
was accorded the right of custody of daughters and sons until they reached the age of nine and 
seven, respectively, at which point the father would assume wilāyat al-tarbiya and supervise the 
education of the children. Kholoussy indeed notes that judges on the shariʿa courts in early 
twentieth-century Egypt consistently gave fathers the primary responsibility for raising children. 
Interestingly, she also notes that, under influence from nationalist discourse, judges in the early 
decades of the twentieth century began to extend the custody rights of divorced women. This 
development would gain momentum toward the end of the twentieth century and reach its apex 
in the early 2000s. In 1985, custody rights were amended by PSL no. 100, requiring boys to stay 
with their mothers until the age of ten and girls until the age of twelve. The judge was 
empowered to extend the custody of the boy until he reached fifteen and the girl until she 
married (Article 18).
33
 Later, in 2000, a ministerial decree was issued declaring that the non-
custody holder was entitled to see his or her children for a minimum period of three hours a week 
(Article 5 of Decree no. 1087 of 2000). While this amendment was intended to protect the rights 
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of the non-custody holder, in practice this led to children seeing their fathers three hours per 
week only, and sometimes even less.
34
 
Since it usually was, and is, the father who becomes the non-custody holder upon 
divorce, in practice this meant that many fathers were prevented from intensive involvement in 
the lives of their children. This became even more difficult, when 2005 legislation prescribed 
that, in the event of divorce, both boys and girls would stay with their mother until the age of 
fifteen (Art. 1 of Law no. 4 of 2005). After this age, the law provided the child with the right to 
choose whether to stay with the mother (without custody fees) or the father. The girl was allowed 
to decide to remain with the mother until she married and the boy until he reached “maturity of 
mind” (sinn al-rushd). Finally, in 2008 an amendment to the child law transferred educational 
guardianship from the father to the custody holder (Art. 54 of Law no. 126 of 2008), which, in 
most cases, was the mother. This potentially controversial reform, which was unique in the 
region,
35
 was justified by referring to the interest (maslaha) of the child.
36
 
Prior to these reforms, which began in 2000, it was still possible for an academic to 
accurately claim that “[The fact t]hat in almost all Islamic law, upon divorce, control of children 
eventually has reverted to the father and that the father’s family has had priority over the mother 
when the father is dead or not available is evidence of men’s property in their children.”37 In 
twenty-first century Egypt, this was no longer the case. On a legal level, women could divorce at 
will while simultaneously keeping their children.
38
 Meanwhile the father’s right to guardianship 
of the children had become increasingly limited by law. Formally, however, the husband 
remained the head of the family and thus kept the duty to provide maintenance for his family 
while his wife had a legal duty to remain obedient to him, on penalty of losing her right to 
nafaqa (maintenance).  
 
 
The 2011 Revolution: the Counter-Revolution of Men?  
 
After the ouster of Hosni Mubarak, women gathered at Tahrir Square on 8 March 2011–this time 
to celebrate International Women’s Day. They were confronted with groups of men who 
harassed them by shouting that they had to go home because they belonged in the kitchen. Some 
women were even physically harassed. The event was not an isolated incident: since the ouster of 
Mubarak, calls for freedom, dignity, and social justice have been heard alongside demands to 
curtail women’s rights, especially in the field of family law.  
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The most fervent opposition has been in the hands of groups of divorced fathers. It is 
important to note that while some of these groups were already established before the 2011 
revolution, the Egyptian revolution opened space for a new type of gender politics through which 
these small groups of divorced fathers suddenly gained prominence.
39
 In the face of the extensive 
family law reforms of the 2000s, the divorced fathers’ groups advocated a restoration of 
manhood, including new ideas on the meaning of fatherhood. Calling for a revolution in family 
law, the groups included “The Movement for Saving the Egyptian Family,” “The Movement of 
the Revolution of Men,” “Egypt First”, and “The Network of Men Harmed by the Personal 
Status Laws.” An important focus for the men’s groups was the khulʿ law of 2000, which some 
argued had led to higher rates of divorce, broken kinship ties, and even religious extremism.
40
 
They also targeted the wave of PSL reforms, which followed in its wake. These groups may have 
been too small to merit the term “movement,” but they compensated for their size by being rather 
vocal, having arranged demonstrations outside Egypt’s first freely elected parliament and other 
high-profile places such as the cabinet, the ministry of justice, and al-Azhar.
41
 The divorced 
fathers not only claimed that the “Suzanne Mubarak laws” were passed in an undemocratic way, 
but they also believed these laws contradicted shariʿa as well as Egyptian culture (thaqāfa).42 
The former first lady was frequently described as an agent of the UN, as were Egyptian women’s 
rights organizations. Accordingly, the laws were described as threatening the Egyptian family 
and social order with collapse through a breakdown of traditional cultural norms.
43
 Occasionally, 
they were also portrayed as part of a Zionist conspiracy against the Egyptian family and 
therefore also “the Arab family.”44 
The sense of emasculation under the Mubarak regime appeared to be a politically 
resonant issue. Pratt and Abdalla have linked this emasculation to authoritarian neo-liberalism 
which strengthened existing social, economic and political structures while eroding work 
opportunities.
45
 This made many men unable to fulfill their part of what Kandiyoti calls the 
“patriarchal bargain,” that is to say their ability to provide nafaqa.46 According to Abdalla 
(2014), many middle-class men voted for the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt’s first free 
parliamentary election in 2012 because they “felt emasculated” during the Mubarak regime, a 
sentiment which pervades Egyptian films and cartoons of that period.
47
 “The Movement for 
Saving the Egyptian Family,” for example, aimed to restore the figure of al-rajul al-ḥaqīqī (the 
real man) who had regained his strength at home, as religious law guaranteed him, and who 
could be “a father to children who have been legally seized from him by their mother, who took 
custody and left him just to write checks.” In line with this, the “real man” was also “a husband 
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who seeks a wife who does not intend to cause him the pain that other wives cause their 
husbands, and who will not divorce him illegally (i.e. against shariʿa).”48 According to “The 
Network of Men Harmed by the Personal Status Laws,” men “who fought colonialism and drank 
the blood of Zionists in the Sinai are these days unable to have custody of their children for two 
days.” In order to rectify this situation, they called on the “men of Egypt [to] shout in the streets 
in order to see and raise their children as the law of God says.”49 Here, redeeming masculine 
identity and privilege in the family were linked tothe defense of the homeland. 
One of the most clamorous groups refers to itself as “The Revolution of Men” (thawrat 
al-rijāl).  The movement is led by a lawyer from the delta town of Tanta named Walid Zahran. 
Walid Zahran has strongly opposed the CEDAW and its principles of equality in family 
relations, which he viewed as an alien imposition threatening to destroy Egyptian family 
relations and the nation as a whole. He has argued that the convention promotes equality and 
freedom without limit (musāwāh wa ḥurriyya dūna ḥudūd) and poses a threat to traditional 
cultural norms. Meanwhile he has wished that Suzanne Mubarak would “burn in hell” for having 
tried to destroy the Egyptian family in return for foreign funding. It was important for Walid 
Zahran that his movement, which included around 3000 men by his count, should remain a grass 
roots organization, and resist both elite decadence and what he called “foreign influence.”50 
Many of the arguments put forward by Walid Zahran and the other groups of divorced 
fathers hardly differed from those aired by the political actors and organizations opposing family 
law legislation in the decade preceding the revolution.
51
 There was, however, a shift in the 
debate’s tone. This is evidenced by a comparison of the political cartoons that appeared in the 
newspapers of the 2000s to cartoons in opposition newspapers and street art after the revolution. 
Whereas the former generally articulated a message of sex and gender reversal – (men would 
become women and women would become men), their post-revolutionary counterparts 
frequently portrayed men as protectors in relation to passive and submissive women.
52
 This 
difference shows that the 2011 revolution opened up space for those wishing to redeem men’s 
shattered pride and re-establish their authority in the family, a wish that was articulated by the 
widespread call to abolish the provision on khulʿ, a symbol of men’s submission to women. 
It is important to note that although a reversal of the khulʿ law figured among the 
demands of the fathers’ groups, priority was given to amending the laws regulating parental 
responsibilities. Walid Zahran (from “The Revolution of Men”) and Samih Hasan (from “The 
Network of Men Harmed by the Personal Status Laws”) have argued that the nuclear family can 
continue to be strong in the event of divorce even if the parents have less contact. Both men have 
advocated a concept of joint care (riʿāya mushtaraka), the ideal whereby both parents take care 
of the children on the basis of mutual trust and consultation instead of delegating this task to the 
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mother alone. While the men’s movements blamed the current personal status laws for imposing 
Western values on Egyptian society, it is worth noting that their conception of joint care was 
influenced by the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and the regulations concerning 
visitation in European countries.
53
 
In the hierarchy of priorities held by the fathers’ groups, the desire for joint care after 
divorce appeared to be their main concern. In the words of Samih Hasan: “I want to see my 
daughter, feed her and buy her clothes.” Yet, according to Hasan, he was only allowed to see her 
in a public place for three hours per week and even this was frequently made difficult by the 
child’s mother. Hasan also argued that the limited amount of time he could spend with his 
daughter prevented her from getting to know her grandparents on his side as well as the children 
from his new wife. Hence, in addition to rectifying injustice against men (by abolishing khulʿ 
and allowing joint care), “The Revolution of Men” and “The Network of Men Harmed by the 
Personal Status Laws” also sought to strengthen the bonds between the members of the nuclear 
family (through the concept of joint care) and the extended family by demanding the right of 
children to see their grandparents and other relatives on both sides of the family instead of 
merely those of the custody holder. Although it is certainly true that these groups denounced 
current family laws for importation of “Western values” and sought to strengthen male authority 
in the family through a masculine discourse, the movement did not merely seek the reinstatement 
of the traditional male family head. Instead, they advocated child-centered companionate 
marriage under mutual supervision and care from an early age by both the mother and the father. 
Advocates also believed that introducing joint care was easier than amending other provisions 
because it could be altered with a ministerial decree and did not require new legislation. 
In comparing their views to the period preceding the revolution, it is clear that the same 
arguments prevailed to a great extent: the reforms were a Western invention that opposed the 
principles of shariʿa and were intended to destroy the Egyptian family and Egyptian society. 
Both before and after the revolution, the issue of women’s rights in marriage and the family 
provoked much controversy. Yet throughout the twentieth century reformers assigned upon 
mothers the duties of child-rearing and education,
54
 while in the post-revolutionary period some 
discourses moved away from these conceptions of motherhood and fatherhood and instead 
seemed to promote the ideal of both husband and wife jointly taking care of their child(ren)’s 
education and upbringing.  
This shift in discourse on the law is partly related to the sense of emasculation so 
characteristic of the Mubarak-era. As previously discussed, Egyptian personal status law dictates 
that it is the husband’s responsibility to provide for his family. In return for this, a husband has 
the right to demand obedience from his wife, even to the extent that she must ask his permission 
to leave the house. Yet, with high levels of unemployment making it impossible for many men to 
fulfill their marital obligations, or even worse to marry in the first place, an abundance of males 
cannot take on their share of the patriarchal bargain. Furthermore, many women now work 
outside the house and contribute to the costs of marriage and setting up the matrimonial home.
55
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One may argue that with the deterioration of the husbands’ role as sole breadwinner, the groups 
of divorced fathers looked for alternative ways to define their place in the family and their 
relationship to their wives and children. The next pertinent issue to gauge, however, is the 
reaction of the divorced mothers of Egypt to this challenge. 
 
Difficulties in Pointing Out the “Feminist” and “Hominist” Voice 
 
Divorced women have felt threatened by the demands of the vocal fathers’ rights groups. The 
ʾummahāt ḥāḍanāt maṣr (“Mothers: the Custody Holders of Egypt”) in particular fought against 
the demands by fathers’ groups to change the existing family law provisions, focusing on khulʿ, 
custody, and ruʾya (visitation). This group argued that the reforms as suggested by the father’s 
groups would have a negative impact on both their welfare and their children’s. They further 
contended that the laws governing custody and women’s divorce rights were not imported 
Western ideas imposed on Egyptian society by Suzanne Mubarak and the women’s NGOs under 
her wing, but were based on Islamic religion and in line with the principles of the shariʿa.56 
Although the emergence of the fathers’ group is not surprising because there were few, if 
any, groups representing their demands, the founding of  “Mothers: the Custody Holders of 
Egypt” is remarkable particularly because the group is headed by two men: Muhammad Jamal 
al-Din al-Lishi and Ibrahim Naddan. Apart from being fathers of divorced daughters,
57
 another 
possible explanation for the establishment of this movement under the leadership of two men 
might be the fact that Egyptian women activists have frequently been labeled as agents of 
Western imperialism both before and after the revolution.
 As a consequence, women’s groups 
were reluctant to enter the public debate in the period immediately following the revolution. This 
especially applied to those who had worked in uncomfortable alliance with Suzanne Mubarak’s 
National Council for Women (NCW). This did not mean that there were no advocates for 
women’s rights in the post-revolutionary era. Spurred by the deposition of Mubarak in February 
2011, NGOs that aimed to address gender inequalities created a number of new coalitions. The 
Coalition of Egyptian Feminist Organizations (CEFO) was among the most significant. 
Independent from the NCW, CEFO drafted a proposal containing principles and provisions 
meant to ensure women’s equal political and economic rights as citizens in the post-
revolutionary constitution. In an attempt to gain democratic legitimacy for their demands, the 
CEFO consulted women nationwide through opinion polls and questionnaires.  
Interestingly, the coalition’s draft document did not touch on the issue of family law, 
although this issue was raised by many women whose opinion was sought. This perhaps 
reflected the reluctance with which women activists approached the issue of family law after the 
revolution. Moreover, the document did not mention the word “family” at all. In the document, 
the coalition attempted to move away from the identification of women primarily in terms of 
their reproductive and nurturing role within their families. In ways similar to the vision of the 
divorced fathers’ groups, the coalition sought to safeguard childcare (riʿāyat al-ṭifl) as a joint 
responsibility between the parents and proposed to deal with the issue of childhood and women’s 
citizenship rights under separate paragraphs.
58
 This division was also present in a statement made 
by one of the most prominent ex-members of the NCW–lawyer Mona Zulfiqar. In the run-up to 
the national referendum on the draft constitution in December 2012, Zulfiqar issued a statement 
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that included suggestions for amending the draft constitution. This included the suggestion that 
the state should offer both mothers (al-ʾummahāt) and fathers (al-ʾābāʾ) the opportunity to 
reconcile their duties towards the family and their work.
59
 By seeking to carve out a space for 
women independent of their historical role as mothers of the nation, both of these documents 
represented an important transition away from the nationalist discourse of the beginning of the 
twentieth century which identified domesticity and women’s role as caretakers as the basis for 
women’s citizenship.60 
While CEFO was reluctant to touch on issues of family law and attempted to avoid 
defining the rights of women in the context of the family, the top priority for the “Mothers: the 
Custody Holders of Egypt” was the family and its sole aim was to defend the existing family law 
provisions against the claims of men’s groups. In opposition to the NCW and the CEFO, their 
Facebook declarations did not portray childcare as a joint responsibility between parents, but 
rather as a duty of mothers, if only because Islamic shariʿa gave mothers the right to have 
custody of their children.
61
 Their statements also displayed their belief that it is the father’s duty 
to provide nafaqa for the children. Specifically, they argued that it was hypocritical for fathers to 
demand an increase in the weekly visitation from three to forty-eight hours when they 
simultaneously petitioned the court to reduce the amount of nafaqa they are supposed to pay for 
their children. Moreover, they argued that when fathers failed to provide, mothers had a shariʿa-
based right to divorce (through khulʿ).62 In general, the “Mothers: the Custody Holders of Egypt” 
emphasized the dual roles of mothers as nurturers and fathers as providers.  
It is interesting to note that “Mothers: the Custody Holders of Egypt” shared this view 
with a new prominent player in the public sphere: the female section of the Muslim Brotherhood 
which was in fact Egypt’s largest organization of women activists. It is beyond the scope of this 
investigation to explore their post-revolutionary emergence in great detail but it is important to 
note that while the female section of the Muslim Brotherhood also emphasized mothers’ duty as 
caretakers and fathers’ as providers, there were significant differences between their positions 
and those of the divorced mothers. For instance, female MPs from the Muslim Brotherhood’s 
Freedom and Justice Party used the People’s Assembly to severely criticize the extant legal 
provisions on custody and visitation. 
Hence, in Egypt’s transitional public debate it was not easy either to give a definition of 
men’s and women’s rights or to highlight who represented the “feminist” or “hominist” voice. 
While the divorced fathers and the CEFO seemingly shared the same notions on motherhood and 
fatherhood, they differed on the roles of a husband and a wife within marriage. And while the 
divorced mothers and the female members of the MB differed in their understanding of what it 
means to be a father and a mother, they had similar views on the roles of a husband and a wife 
within marriage. In this pluriform field of participants, the smaller groups sought the support of 
the ‘bigger players’ with considerable political and religious influence. 
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High Politics and the Exigencies of the Transition Period 
 
The Divorced Fathers’ and Mothers’ Courtship with the Muslim Brotherhood, the Salafists, and 
al-Azhar 
 
For most of 2011, the armed forces were the official rulers of the country. Towards the end of 
2011, however, the political situation started to change considerably when Egyptians elected a 
new parliament in two rounds (November 2011 and January 2012), along with a new president 
(elections in May and June 2012). Between January 2012, when Egypt’s new parliament first 
convened, and June 2012, when it was abruptly dissolved, five different law proposals dealing 
with minimum age of marriage, judicial divorce through khulʿ, child custody, and visitation 
rights after divorce were submitted by individual MPs to the Committee of Proposals and 
Complaints.
63
 However, since the Islamist-dominated parliament was dissolved by Egypt’s High 
Constitutional Court in June 2012, none of these law proposals moved beyond this committee. 
The proposals nevertheless provide an opportunity to analyze important discursive battles 
between agents and institutions with different and sometimes conflicting interests. 
During Mubarak’s presidency the vast majority of law proposals were initiated by the 
executive which was dominated by the former president’s National Democratic Party.64 This was 
different in the post-revolutionary period when a great number of civil society organizations 
approached members of parliament in a bid to see their aims realized. Throughout the 
transitional period, the fathers’ and mothers’ groups staged demonstrations in front of such 
places as the cabinet, the Ministry of Justice, and al-Azhar. Meanwhile, following the 
parliamentary elections in which the Brotherhood and the Salafist political party al-Nūr won the 
majority of seats, the divorced fathers decided to court these central parties along with several 
other political actors. 
This, however, did not turn these groups of divorced fathers into Islamists. Voorhoeve 
has pointed out that in post-revolutionary Tunisia and the Arab World in general, one should be 
careful to not analyze family law debates along a divide of Islamists versus secularists/feminists 
because there is a tension between these categories and actual social complexities.
65
 The same 
applies in Egypt.
66
 That the founders of both “The Revolution of Men” and the “The Network of 
Men Harmed by the Personal Status Laws” did not support the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom 
and Justice Party (although they expressed some sympathy with them and the Salafist political 
party al-Nūr) testifies to this. Both Walid Zahrin and Samih Hasan expressed deep 
disappointment with Egypt’s first freely elected parliament and especially with the performance 
of the Muslim Brotherhood who they believed only served “their own narrow interests.” They 
nevertheless made a conscious choice to court any political party that could help them turn their 
proposals into law. For example, following a large-scale demonstration outside the People’s 
Assembly on 23 April 2012, “The Revolution of Men” submitted a leaflet to several members of 
parliament containing their demands, with the notable exception of the khulʿ law. The fact that 
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this demand was dropped suggests that an amendment to this law was viewed as less feasible, 
particularly after the Committee of Proposals and Complaints had rejected the proposal of an 
independent MP – Muhammad al-Umda–to abolish khulʿ on 8 April 2012.67 
On 28 April 2012, just a few days after the divorced fathers’ demonstration in front of the 
People’s Assembly, the Proposals and Complaints Committee received a bill submitted by 
Hamida Sulayman, an MP from the Salafist al-Nūr party. Interestingly, the proposal included 
many of the demands made by “The Revolution of Men”, most notably the provisions on 
custody, visitation, and educational guardianship. Sulayman proposed to lower the age of 
custody to seven and nine years for boys and girls respectively and added the stipulation of 
mutual supervision (riʿāya mushtaraka) with the non-custody holder having the right to see the 
child two days per week. The latter, he argued, was necessary for the father to play a larger role 
in upbringing (tanshīʾ) and education (tarbiya) as well as for the child to get to know the family 
on the side of the non-custody holder. In addition to this, he proposed to return educational 
guardianship to the father in accordance with shariʿa.68 
The “Mothers: the Custody Holders of Egypt” and CEFO fiercely rejected this proposed 
law. Announcing their full adherence to the shariʿa, the divorced mothers argued that al-Azhar’s 
Academy for Islamic Research had repeatedly approved the existing personal status laws (in 
2007, 2009 and 2011) to counter the argument of the opposition that these laws were anti-shariʿa 
because they had been issued during Mubarak’s presidency.69 Meanwhile, the members of the 
CEFO signed a document addressed to both houses of parliament expressing their opposition to 
Hamida Sulayman’s law proposal. They did not reject the proposed law on religious grounds, but 
rather argued that the propositions were against the best interest of the child and contradicted the 
principles of both the revolution and human rights treaties on the rights of women and children 
ratified by Egypt. 
Fighting for the preservation of extant PSL provisions, “Mothers: the Custody Holders of 
Egypt” frequently sought support for their position by referring to the opinions of the religious 
scholars of al-Azhar, much in the same way the women’s NGOs had done in the period 
preceding the January 25 revolution. The scholars of al-Azhar had provided the latter’s reform 
proposals with religious legitimacy, yet they steered a more independent course in the 
transitional period. For instance, on 22 May, shortly before the dissolution of the parliament in 
June 2012, al-Azhar’s Academy for Islamic Research arranged an emergency meeting during 
which it rejected the demand of the previously mentioned independent MP–al-Umda–to cancel 
the khulʿ law. The Academy argued that khulʿ is a right guaranteed to women by Islamic shariʿa 
in the same way that repudiation is permissible for men. It also upheld a previous opinion 
endorsing the rules on the age of custody for boys and girls. However, on the point of 
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educational guardianship, the Academy deviated from the law by claiming that educational 
guardianship is a right that belongs to the father instead of the custody holder as is claimed in the 
law, although it added that it was not an absolute right since the participation of the mother is 
mandatory in deciding on the type of education and school.
70
 
  
Defining the Principles of Islamic Shari‘a in a Changing Constitutional Order: The Case of 
Educational Guardianship 
 
At the time of the Academy’s declaration in June 2012,71 the provision on educational 
guardianship had been under legal review for a few years. In 2009, a divorced father had lodged 
a claim with the Supreme Administrative Court wherein he argued that the article on educational 
guardianship, which transferred this right from the father to the custody holder, was violating the 
principles of the shariʿa (Art. 54 of Law no. 126 of 2008).72 The Supreme Administrative Court 
issued a temporary ruling in January 2010 stating that this right would be returned to the father 
until the HCC issued a ruling on the article’s compliance with the constitution.73 
Since its inception in 1979, the HCC has often played a decisive role in controversial 
matters, such as the khulʿ article of the Personal Status Law no. 1 of 2000, which it declared 
constitutional in December 2002. Although the al-Azhar law of 1961 states that the Academy for 
Islamic Research is the supreme religious establishment in Egypt (Law 103/1961), the HCC 
established itself as the ultimately authority concerned with the interpretation of the Islamic 
tradition in 1993.
74
 The 2012 constitution challenged the position of the court as the ultimate 
authority concerned with the interpretation of Islam by clearly stating in Article 4 that al-Azhar, 
which was confirmed as an independent institution, should be consulted in all matters pertaining 
to Islamic law.
75
 Similar to the magistrates of the HCC, however, the scholars of al-Azhar were 
limited in their interpretation of Islamic law by the introduction of a new constitutional 
provision. While open to considerable interpretation, Article 219 assigned an important place to 
the teachings of the four Sunni schools of law.
76
 This represented a departure from the 1993 
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ruling where the HCC’s judges had identified the principles of Islamic shari‘a as those rulings 
whose origin and interpretations are definite (not open to interpretation), with no binding 
reference to the orthodox interpretations of the four Sunni schools of law. It also contrasted with 
the approach adopted by the religious authorities of al-Azhar who had officially endorsed the 
family law reforms passed in the 2000s, also by surpassing the teachings of the four schools of 
law.  
With the case on educational guardianship being the only “Suzanne Mubarak” provision 
which reached as far as the HCC after the revolution, it could have provided a few answers about 
how these issues would be decided in the post-revolutionary legal realm. It would have been 
interesting to see whether the magistrates of the HCC would have consulted the scholars of al-
Azhar on this matter and whether the final court ruling would take into account the teachings of 
the four schools of Islamic jurisprudence. This ruling would also have shed more light on the 
future of this provision in particular and the “Suzanne Mubarak” provisions in general. However, 
when the Morsi government was removed, the case on educational guardianship was still 
pending
77
 and in the transitional constitutional declaration issued by Interim President Adli 
Mansur in July 2013, Article 4 on the new position of al-Azhar was removed while Article 219 
was retained as part of Article 1 concerning the state’s identity, language, and religion.78 In the 
period between the ouster of Hosni Mubarak and Muhammad Morsi, the revolutionary family 
law reforms of the 2000s remained unchanged. Which interpretations of shariʿa will be made to 
apply in Egyptian family law in the future is likely to depend on the dynamics of Egyptian 
politics where old and new actors claim the interpretive authority of Islam.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this article we have compared public debates and controversies surrounding family law in pre-
and post-revolutionary Egypt. We began by focusing attention on the period from 1919–when 
the stage was first set for family law reforms–up until the first decade of the twenty-first century, 
when a series of legislative reforms were promulgated that significantly changed the rights of 
men and women in the family. The so-called law of khul‘ granted women the right to divorce 
without a husband’s consent. In the case of divorce, women were given primary responsibility 
for the daily care of their children to such an extent that educational guardianship–formerly a 
right and duty of the father–was transferred to the mother in cases of divorce. Meanwhile, men 
remained responsible for providing financially for their wives and children. 
This article highlighted some important similarities between the two periods. Both before 
and after the 2011 revolution, the protection of the Egyptian family was of primary concern, 
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among proponents as well as opponents of the reforms. Whereas in the early twentieth century 
husbands were castigated for causing the high divorce rate, at the start of the new millennium, 
women bore the brunt of the blame. It was argued that women used their newly acquired divorce 
rights frivolously and caused a dramatic increase in the divorce rate. Religious authority also 
played an important role as family law remains anchored in Islamic shariʿa, albeit in a codified 
form. 
We also found some significant differences. While the family law reforms of the 2000s 
were passed in a top-down manner, we argued that the Egyptian revolution of 25 January 2011 
opened space in the public debate for a new group of political actors that had a personal interest 
in seeking to strengthen the rights of fathers and mothers in the case of divorce. Seeking to 
amend and preserve the extant PSL provisions, these groups of divorced fathers and mothers, 
although small, became vocal. We argued that their demands should be seen in the light of 
renegotiation of gender relations. Where classical Islamic law and modern day personal status 
codes dictate that a husband should be the provider and a wife obedient in return, economic 
hardships in Egypt make it increasingly difficult for many husbands to live up to this ideal. This 
has forced many husbands to redefine their position within the family by promoting new ideas 
concerning parenthood where childcare was recast as a shared responsibility. This represented a 
major departure from the discourse of twentieth century reformers who assigned upon mothers 
the duty of taking care of child(ren)’s upbringing and education.  
In an attempt to realize their goals, the groups of divorced fathers and mothers forged 
alliances with prominent political actors and institutions that competed over authority to define 
Islamic shari‘a after the ouster of Mubarak. While this constituted a new form of activism, 
debates over family law should also be read in conjunction with changes in the constitutional 
order. In the period between the promulgation of the December 2012 constitution and the 
constitution of July 2013, the future of the family law reforms issued during the 2000s looked 
uncertain, especially after the controversial Article 219 was added to the 2012 constitution. 
Although ambiguous, Article 219 assigned an important place to the teachings of the four Sunni 
schools of law, whereas the so-called Suzanne Mubarak laws all deviated from the teachings of 
the four schools of law. It was therefore not unlikely that the judges of the High Constitutional 
Court would have been forced to change the provisions on khulʿ, age of custody, and educational 
guardianship should a lawsuit concerning their conformity to Islamic law have been raised. In 
the 2014 constitution, Article 219 was replaced by a preamble, which reaffirmed the principles of 
shariʿa as interpreted by the High Constitutional Court in the 1990s. Hence, the HCC appeared 
to have consolidated its authority as the institution responsible for arbitrating the Islamic 
legitimacy of Egypt’s laws. At the same time, the position of al-Azhar remains strong in the 
January 2014 constitution. While the constitution no longer makes it obligatory to consult al-
Azhar on matters dealing with Islamic shari‘a, it does state that al-Azhar is the main reference 
for Islamic affairs (Article 7). At the time of writing, it remains to be seen how the judges on this 
court will discharge their responsibilities outlined in the constitutional preamble, and whether 
they will seek the assistance of al-Azhar. In November 2014, the religious scholars of al-Azhar 
issued a fatwa in which they stated that fathers can only see their children with the consent of the 
mother. The maternal custody age, so they argued, should remain as it is.
79
 This indicates (the 
divorced fathers’ grass-root activism notwithstanding) that for the time being the dynamics of 
family law reform and especially the top-down manner in which shari‘a is defined have not been 
disrupted in post-revolutionary Egypt. 
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